Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81M00980R000400080084-8

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)					
KAMPILES, William P.					

FROM:
Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security

STAT

EXTENSION

NO. OLC 78-3029/11

DATE 13 SEP 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. Legislative Counsel Attn:				The attached memoranda respond to Section VI - Further Steps being Taken - of the KAMPILES' briefing outline. Included are memoranda dealing with the Security Task Force, Zero Based Review Techniques, General Vogt's review and DDCI memorandum dated 1 September 1978.
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In accordance with your specific request of 18 August 1978, a comprehensive review of the Agency's security policies and procedures has commenced.

During the week of 21 August the organization and staffing of a Security Review Task Force was undertaken. The Task Force will approach the review in three segments. Each segment staff will function under the leadership of a senior experienced officer. The segments will address, separately, Personnel Security, Physical Security, and Information Control and Protection. The magnitude of the task is awesome, and the Director of Security estimates a comprehensive review will require a minimum of sixty (60) days.

The Personnel Security Segment of the Task Force intends to investigate all periods of an employee's career from preemployment processing through post-employment counseling. It is their intent to survey personnel recruitment and assignment policies and procedures which are quite varied from directorate to directorate and from office to office. Although the emphasis in this segment will be on staff employees, the Task Force will also survey the several other types of individuals who are utilized by the Agency. The entire security clearance process from pre-field investigation to final adjudication will be reviewed, as will the vast number of policies and procedures that pertain during the employment phase.

The employment phase topics include security indoctrination/reindoctrination; marriage, including marriage to an alien; outside activities; handling of misconduct incidents; counterintelligence review of high risk personnel and organizational units; the reinvestigation program; security and suitability reviews for overseas candidates; Agency management responsibilities; and the Personnel Evaluation Board. Finally, the Agency's out-processing policies and procedures as well as current policies relative to post-employment counseling will be addressed under this segment.

The Task Force will exclude from its review the operational security policy procedures and practices concerning those individuals who are utilized by the Directorate of

Operations in an operational and informational capacity such as double agents and clandestine sources. That policy is a DDO responsibility.

The Physical Security Segment has an enormous task at hand. This segment will limit the scope of their review by concentrating primarily upon the physical security program as it is pursued within the Headquarters Building. The substantive areas which constitute the physical security program of the Agency can be examined in relation to operations within the Headquarters Building within a reasonable time frame.

Essentially our physical security policies and procedures at Headquarters have been adopted in our domestic and overseas facilities, and available resource and time constraints dictate that but cursory reference be given to the nature and scope of the overseas and domestic facilities outside Washington during the survey. Similarly, this review will not specifically cover the physical security aspects of our industrial security program because that subject has been thoroughly reviewed during the past year. And finally, we consider the technical threat as well as the measures which have been implemented to counter this threat as beyond the scope of this review.

The Physical Security Segment of the Task Force will address thoroughly the policies and procedures pertaining to: perimeter security; building security; access controls for all types of people from staff employees to vendors; badges; entry and exit inspection procedures; internal personnel control; storage of classified information; the Agency's guard program; intrusion detection systems and other monitoring equipment; after hours security procedures and the security violation program.

The Information Control and Protection Segment proposes to review the application by CIA of directives and regulations governing the production, marking, classification, reproduction, transmission, inventory and overall control of classified information. These will be reviewed for current applicability to determine whether rules are being observed, and, if so, whether a significant measure of control results from their observance. The scope of this segment will include an inquiry into the level and efficiency of employee training in document control procedures; an examination of the posibility

of handling information at lower levels of classification
or compartmentation; exploration of methods to reduce the
amount of classified material retained in the Agency; inquiry
into the efficacy of current ADP and microform information
control, and the state of pre-planning for future information
technology requirements. Finally, we intend to examine alter-
native ways of controlling accountability for classified
materials, including automated techniques.

Obviously, to conduct the survey effectively, the
Task Force will require the complete cooperation of the
Agency's population. For example, to meaningfully describe
current procedures under the Personnel Security Segment is
going to require close cooperation with several offices,
especially the Office of Personnel and the Office of Medical
Services. Furthermore, several offices throughout the Agency
are involved in the recruitment of personnel, and their
cooperation will also be necessary. Consequently, it is recom-
mended that you solicit the cooperation of all directorates
with the members of the Task Force.

The Task Force will approach its task by extensive
documentary reviews, personal interviews both within and
external to the Agency, and by discussion within the Task
Force which will lead to a series of recommendations concerning
the Agency's security program. The Task Force members have
been exhorted to approach the task, particularly the recommen-
dations, with absolute objectivity and personal integrity, as
we view the review as an opportunity to assure our security
policies and procedures are right for the time.

We envision a final report to be submitted to you
by 3 November 1978. We expect that report to be in four
parts: (a) a description of current policies and procedures;
(b) analysis of current policies and procedures; (c) conclusions;
and (d) recommendations.

ZERO BASED REVIEW TECHNIQUES

I have initiated a system of a Zero Based Clearance
Review technique to positively assure that cleared personnel
actually need the accesses they hold. It demands a positive
restatement by management officials of the rationale for each
individual clearance held within areas under their jurisdiction.
These statements are then reviewed by an impartial arbiter
who confirms or denies the requirements with tasking officials
as necessary. Our initial reviews utilizing this technique
have resulted in significant reductions of access requirements.
I envision continuation of this program and expect that it
will serve as a vehicle for reducing the number of persons
approved for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information.

SUBJECT: General Vogt's Review

    I've recently held discussions on the adequacy of our
compartmentation systems with senior officers in the com-
munity. We felt that there is a need to take a hard look
at the present system with a view toward:

- developing unified management and
  standards

- simplifying and clarifying our
  procedures

- downgrading, declassifying and decompart-
  menting to the maximum extent consistent
  with the protection of vital sources and
  methods

- rebuilding security consciousness and
  restoring the proper implementation of
  "need to know"

- strengthening the barriers between
  compartments to avoid "spill-over" from
  one to another

- better providing for the actual needs of
  tactical commanders

    I've recently asked General John W. Vogt, USAF (Retired)
to head a small group of representatives of participating
agencies to study this matter and make recommendations,
including possibly even coming up with a new and simplified
system.